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NOTE
CONSTRUCTION DRAWINGS THAT WORK-
OR MAYBE NOT?: ARCHITECTS GET A FREE
PASS IN OHIO
Jason Shoemaker'
I. INTRODUCTION
The construction industry in the United States employs five percent of the
total workforce, represents roughly thirteen percent of the annual gross
domestic product, and is the largest sector of the U.S. economy.' A
construction project involves a series of contractual relationships between
owner/architect and owner/contractor. These interrelated relationships are
often a "veritable minefield of conflict which is a fertile source of recurring,
often unique issues."
2
From this "veritable minefield of conflict," the Spearin Doctrine emerged
in the early part of the Twentieth Century from a Supreme Court case
involving defective construction documents. The Spearin Doctrine holds that
a set of owner-furnished construction documents are impliedly warranted by
the owner to be free from any defects.3 This implied warranty could not be
negated by any express contract provisions which serve to shift liability for
design defects to the contractor.4 This doctrine was applied by courts in Ohio
prior to April 2007 to hold contractors liable only for conditions that a
reasonable pre-site inspection would have revealed or when the contractor
was not acting in good faith.5 However, in April 2007, the Supreme Court of
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1. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform in a
Transactional System, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 463 (1998) (citing Jimmie Hunze, CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTS 1-2 (1993)).
2. Id. (citing Lawrence P. Simpson & Essel R. Dillavou, LAW FOR ENGINEERS AND
ARCHITECTS, xi (1958)).
3. United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 137 (1928).
4. Id.
5. See Lehmkuhl Excavation v. City of Troy, No. 2004-CA-31, 2005 WL 994607, at
24 (Ohio 2005) ("Spearin stands for the proposition that the city cannot make affirmative
statements regarding site conditions and then hold the contractor responsible for any
conditions differing from those asserted by the City, notwithstanding contractual provisions
purporting to do so."); Central Ohio Bd. of Educ. v. Peterson Construction Co., 716 N.E.2d
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Ohio, refusing to follow ninety years of federal and state jurisprudence, held
that a contractor was not entitled to damages as a result of defective plans
prepared by the owner's architect. 6 The court reasoned that an express no-
damages-for-delay clause, since outlawed by the Ohio Legislature,
controlled.7
Part II.A. of this Note introduces the problems inherent in the construction
process, including building owners who are poorly educated about
construction issues, architects who increasingly refuse to be held accountable
for their designs, and contractors who try to make sense of poorly designed
drawings. Part H.B. details the origin of the Spearin Doctrine and how it has
been handled by the Supreme Court. Part III.A. details Ohio cases prior to
the Dugan & Meyers decision that have applied the Spearin Doctrine. Parts
ILI.B and HI.C. chronicle the Dugan & Meyers case and describe what the
decision will mean to the construction industry. Finally, Part IV of this Note
proposes solutions that would come from both the legislature and the
construction industry itself. These are solutions to the difficulties incurred by
Dugan & Meyers Construction Company in their dispute with Ohio State
University.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Nuts and Bolts of the Construction Process
Construction of a building from start to finish involves a complex, intricate
series of relationships, contracts, and transactions, each one giving rise to
different legal responsibilities and potential liabilities. The most important
parties to our discussion of the Spearin Doctrine are the building owner,
architect, and general contractor. The building owner is responsible for
determining three criteria related to the project: the scope of work, the
timeline, and the budget.8 The owner must also communicate these needs
and constraints to the architect. 9 The architect then incorporates these
constraints in developing a set of construction documents that "represent the
final design in the form of drawings and specifications, which are sufficiently
1210 (1998) (A contractor cannot rely upon the Spearin doctrine where the contractor had
unique knowledge the plans were obviously flawed and did not inform the owner).
6. Dugan & Meyers Construction Co. v. Ohio Dep't. of Admin. Servs., 864 N.E.2d 68,
76 (Ohio 2007).
7. Id. at 74.
8. CONSTRUCTION LAW 2 (Carina Y. Ohara et al., eds., 2001) [hereinafter
CONSTRUCTION LAW].
9. Id. at 9.
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detailed and suitable for bidding and building the project."' The general
contractor then takes the construction documents and develops pricing for the
work, submits a bid to the owner, develops schedules and work plans, and
performs the actual construction."
In the U.S., the most common method of construction delivery is called
the "design-bid-build" process. 12 This process begins with an owner
establishing his design criteria and then entering into a contract with an
architect or other design professional. 3 The architect will often be involved
through the final completion of the project, from preparation of the design of
the building and other contract documents to assisting with the construction
management process. 14 The architect may provide additional services for the
owner during the construction process including inspection of the work to
determine quality and conformance with design, interpretation of design
documents, resolution of owner-contractor disputes, approval of contractor
payment applications, processing change orders, and review of the contractor
submittals that propose execution of the design.
15
The next step in the design-bid-build process depends on whether the
project is privately or publicly funded.16  Privately funded construction
projects have more flexibility in the selection of a general contractor, and
often an owner will negotiate directly with one or several builders.
17
However, projects that are funded with taxpayer dollars are governed by
federal and state law and administrative regulations, which are designed to
prevent favoritism and promote fair competition.18 Regardless of whether the
10. Id. at 56.
11. Id.
12. Carl J. Circo, When Specialty Designs Cause Building Disasters: Responsibility for
Shared Architectural and Engineering Services, 84 NEB. L. REv. 162, 168 (2005) (citing
John W. Hinchey, Karl Marx and Design Build, CONSTRUCTION LAW, Winter 2001, at 46).
The primary alternative to the design-bid-build delivery system is the design-build system
where the owner enters into one contract for both design and construction services. Id.
13. THE CONSTRUCTION PROJECT: PHASES, PEOPLE, TERMS, PAPERWORK, PROCESSES 6
(Marilyn Klinger & Marianne Susong eds., 2006) (stating typical design criteria include a
project's budget, environmental restrictions, and other needs).
14. Id. at 7.
15. Circo, supra note 12, at 169 (citing JusT-N SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION LAW,
114-115 (1997). A change order is a written change to the contract scope of work which
results in a revision to the contract price and/or project timeline. THE CONSTRUCTION
PROJECT: PHASES, PEOPLE, TERMS, PAPERWORK, PROCESSES 140 (Marilyn Klinger &
Marianne Susong eds., 2006)
16. Id. at 14.
17. Id.
18. Id. Publicly funded construction projects are controlled by statutes and regulations
such as competitive bidding laws, payment and performance bond statutes, federal and state
2009]
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construction project is public or private, the goal of the bidding process is "to
select the lowest qualified bidder to allow for project completion to the
owner's satisfaction at the most competitive price.' 1 9
Once the lowest responsible bidder is selected, he will enter into a contract
with the owner to build the building per the plans and specifications prepared
by the architect. 20 During the construction process, it is critical to establish a
communication and a decision-making process among the owner, architect,
and the general contractor. 21 Because most owners do not have construction
or architectural expertise in-house and because, for most owners, a
construction project is far removed from their area of focus, they will rely on
the architect as their representative to and protector from the general
22contractor.
The owner and contractor, even in the best of circumstances, have
conflicting interests.23 The contractor's main concern is to protect and
maximize his profit. The owner is primarily interested in having the
contractor complete a building that meets the owner's expectations in terms
of form and function, budget, and schedule.24 Thus, a formalized system of
communication between all parties involved becomes necessary in order to
establish the processes that will provide the means and methods for conflicts
and changes to be resolved as well as to ensure the quality of the project.25
Due to the complex nature of the construction process and interrelation-
ships among owner, architect, and contractor, disputes can and often do
arise.26 Unfortunately, the causes of the problems are also complex. First,
owners increasingly pressure architects to lower professional fees. 27 This
"lowest cost first" mentality leads architects to pay less attention to project
detailing, place design responsibility on contractors, and reduce the level of
false claim acts, prompt pay legislation, minority preference programs, special procurement
regulations, and special procedures for filing and prosecuting claims. CONSTRUCTION LAW,
supra note 8, at 82.
19. Id. at 15.
20. Id. at 18-19.
21. Id. at 19.
22. CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra note 8, at 8.
23. Circo, supra note 12, at 169.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 176, 180.
26. Unfortunately on many projects, because these relationships are not functioning
properly, the finished product does not meet the needs of "both the end-user and the people
creating the product." CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra note 8, at 1.
27. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform in a
Transactional System, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 463,476,478 (1998).
[Vol. 3:183
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job site administration.28 The problem with discounting fees is that while
achieving cost savings to the owner, it enhances the potential for incomplete,
inaccurate, and inadequate designs and job administration.29
An architect does not owe a duty to produce flawless construction
documents. Rather, he only owes a duty to his employer to possess the
necessary technical competency and ability that will enable him to produce
plans and specifications commensurate with similarly situated
professionals. 30 The primary rationale for this level of duty is that architects
have not been found to guarantee results.3 ' In contract disputes arising out of
defective plans, courts traditionally have limited liability of design
professionals solely to the party who hired the professional on the basis of
privity.3 2  Contractors have tried to assert claims based in third party
beneficiary contract principles, but such claims have not found a great deal of
favor with the courts.33 Accordingly, the principal cause of action in design
28. Id.
29. Id. at 19.
30. Circo, supra note 12, at 176, 180.
31. Id. at 175. See Surf Realty Corp. v. Standing, 78 S.E.2d 901, 907 (Va. 1953) ("An
architect does not imply or guarantee a perfect plan or satisfactory result."); Aetna Ins. Co.
v. Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472, 476 (8th Cir. 1968) ("An architect is not a
guarantor or an insurer but as a member of a learned and skilled profession he is under the
duty to exercise the ordinary, reasonable technical skill, ability and competence that is
required of an architect in a similar situation."); White v. Pallay, 119 Ore. 97, 99 (1926) (If
an architect prepares plans and specifications with a level of skill comparable with others in
the business, he is not liable for defects in the plans.).
32. Id. at 185. See, e.g., R.H. Macy & Co. v. Williams Tile & Terrazo Co., 585 F. Supp.
175, 178 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (Professionals are not liable to those not in privity.); Floor Craft
Floor Covering v. Parma Cmty. Gen. Hosp., 560 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ohio 1990) (In the
absence of privity of contract between two disputing parties the general rule is there is no
duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid intangible economic loss or losses to others that do
not arise from tangible physical harm to persons and tangible things."); Guardian Constr. Co.
v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378, 1386 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1990) ("In order for
third-party beneficiary rights to be created, not only is it necessary that performance of the
contract confer a benefit upon a third person that was intended, but the conferring of the
beneficial effect on such third-party, whether it be creditor or donee, should be a material
part of the contract's purpose.").
33. Id. at 185-86. See, e.g., Bernard Johnson, Inc. v. Cont'l Constructors, Inc. 630
S.W.2d 365, 731 (Tex. App. 1982) ("The fact that a contractor will benefit and profit from
plans that are carefully and professionally drawn, and from specifications that are clear and
precise, is an incidental benefit that accrues to the contractor.); Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 519 F. Supp. 60, 72 (S.D. Ga. 1981) ("The law of
Georgia has not been anxious to find that parties not in privity can sue under the aegis of the
third party beneficiary doctrine.").
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liability cases has sounded in tort rather than in contract.34 In tort cases,
however, courts will (absent any public policy considerations) look to the
express terms of the contract to "determine the nature and extent of the duty
recognized for'purposes of tort law. 35
Architects-and by extension owners-therefore try to contractually limit
their tort liability by contractual provisions.36 A good example of a provision
that architects include in their contract is a clause that negates third party
beneficiary claims on the part of the contractor. 37 Another such contract term
used is a "no damages for delay" clause.38 Because a delay in a construction
project inevitably results in an increased expense to one of the parties, the
risk of delay is allocated contractually among the architect, owner, and
contractor.39 Owners will frequently try to eliminate any possible claims
from the contractor requesting additional compensation for delays to the
project.40 Among other provisions, an architect will often insert a clause that
places the burden on the contractor to visit the construction site prior to
34. Id. at 177. See, e.g., Eastern Steel Constructors, Inc. v. City of Salem, 549 S.E.2d
266, 277 (2001) ("A design professional (e.g. an architect or engineer) providing plans and
specifications that will be followed by a contractor in carrying out some aspect of a design,
impliedly warrants to the contractor, notwithstanding the absence of privity of contract
between the contractor and the design professional, that such plans and specifications have
been prepared with the ordinary skill, care and diligence commensurate with that rendered
by members of his or her profession."); Owen v. Dodd, 431 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (M.D.
Miss. 1977) ("Mississippi does recognize the right of a third party to maintain a negligence
claim against an architect with whom there is no privity of contract."); Davidson & Jones,
Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 255 S.E.2d 580, 584 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) ("An architect in
the absence of privity of contract may be sued by a general contractor or the subcontractors
working on a construction project for economic loss foreseeably resulting from breach of an
architect's common law duty of due care in the performance of his contract with the
owner.").
35. Id. at 178. See, e.g., Moundsview Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Buetow & Assoc., 253
N.W.2d 836, 839 (Minn. 1977) ("It is the general rule that the employment of an architect is
a matter of contract, and consequently, he is responsible for all the duties enumerated within
the contract of employment.).
36. Form documents such as those produced by the American Institute of Architects
contain "significant risk shifting and exculpatory language." CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra
note 8, at 53. "It goes without saying that each separate form document... has been drafted
to generally protect the interests of the drafter." Id.
37. CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra note 8, at 75.
38. See THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS BOOK 113 (Daniel A. Brennan et al. eds., 2004)
(A "no damages for delay" clause is an express contractual provision inserted which
"attempts to eliminate any possible claim from the contractor for additional compensation
due to delays.").
39. Id.
40. Id.
[Vol. 3:183
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bidding.41 The intent of this provision is to place the liability of additional
costs regarding unforeseen site conditions squarely on the contractor.
B. Origin of the Spearin Doctrine
In the landmark construction law case Spearin v. United States, a site
visitation clause was at issue. 42 Spearin was a general contractor hired by the
U.S. Government to construct a dry dock at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.43 The
terms of the contract bound Spearin to build the dry dock in accordance with
plans and specifications prepared by the Government. 44 In addition, the
contract contained a general clause that stated, "Intending bidders are
expected to examine the site of the proposed dry-dock and inform themselves
thoroughly of the actual conditions and requirements before submitting
proposals. ' 45
Spearin did, in fact, visit the job site prior to submitting his bid and sought
site-condition information from the civil engineer's office at the Navy.46
However, no mention was made of the fact that the government was aware
that the sewer line, that had to be relocated prior to constructing the dry dock,
had overflowed in the past.47 Spearin proceeded with the relocation of the
sewer line in full compliance with the plans and specifications, and the
Government approved the relocated line as satisfactory.48 But approximately
one year after the relocation, internal pressure caused by a heavy downpour
of rain coupled with a high tide caused the relocated sewer pipe section to
rupture in a number of places, which in turn flooded the excavation site for
the new dry dock. 9
Immediately after this incident, Spearin informed the government that
under the existing plans, the sewers were a menace to the construction
project.5 0 He then refused to proceed any further with the dry dock until the
government either assumed responsibility for the damage that had already
occurred, or repaired the problem that caused the flooding in the first place. 51
The government insisted that the responsibility was on the contractor, and
41. United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 137 (1928).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 133.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 137 n.1.
46. Spearin, 248 U.S. at 134-35.
47. Id. at 133-34.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 135.
51. Id.
20091
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after fifteen months spent in "investigation and fruitless correspondence," the
Secretary of the Navy cancelled the contract with Spearin and hired other
contractors to finish the project.12
Under these facts, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims
decision in favor of Spearin.53 The Supreme Court reasoned that the insertion
of provisions in the plans and specifications that clearly defined the
dimensions, location, and quality of the sewer implied "a warranty, that if the
specifications were complied with, the sewer would be adequate."
5 4
Essentially, under the holding, the contractor was not required to second-
guess the adequacy of the plans to achieve the completed project.55 Further,
the Court stated that the government could not overcome its breach of this
implied warranty by inserting general contract provisions that required the
contractor to make a site visit to determine existing conditions and assume
responsibility for the work until completion and acceptance. 6  Since the
government breached the implied warranty that the plans would be free from
defects, refused to repair the sewer conditions that caused the site to be
unsafe, and then annulled the contract unjustifiably, it was held liable to
Spearin for all damages resulting from the breach.57
In the ninety years since Spearin was decided, the Supreme Court has only
revisited the decision six times. The Court applied the Spearin Doctrine in
Atlantic Dredging Co. v. United States to hold the U.S. Government liable to
a contractor where the Government supplied soil conditions reports and maps
in order for the contractor to dredge a section of the Delaware River.58
However, in a later case, the Court refused to apply the Spearin Doctrine
where the contractor was partially at fault in delays caused by defective
material that was specified by the Government.5 9 The Court even considered
extending the Spearin Doctrine beyond a construction context, but then
refused to do so in holding that the Government was not responsible for third
52. Id. at 135.
53. Id. at 139.
54. Id. at 137.
55. Thomas C. Clark, Application of the Spearin Doctrine to Plans and Specs, Mar. 28,
2005, http://acppubs.com/article/CA512254.html.
56. Spearin, 248 U.S. at 137.
57. Id. at 138.
58. At. Dredging Co. v. United States, 253 U.S. 1, 11 (1920); accord United States v.
Smith, 256 U.S. 11, 17 (1921); compare Sanford & Brooks Co. v. United States, 267 U.S.
455, 456, 458 (1925) (holding that the Spearin Doctrine did not apply where the contractor
did not act in a expeditious manner in regard to a claim for additional compensation as per a
provision in its dredging contract).
59. Robinson v. United States, 261 U.S. 490 (1923).
[Vol. 3:183
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party tort claims resulting from a contractor producing Agent Orange
according to U.S. military specifications.60
Spearin Doctrine issues have been addressed by state courts as well. A
majority of jurisdictions recognize the Spearin Doctrine as controlling law.6'
However, a small minority of states-such as Missouri-do not recognize
that an owner impliedly warrants construction documents to be free from
defects.
62
HI. SPEARIN GETS DERAILED IN OHIO
A. Application of the Spearin Doctrine by Ohio Courts-Prelude to Dugan
& Meyers
The Spearin Doctrine was first recognized by Ohio in S & M Constructors
v. City of Columbus ("S & M'). 63 The Ohio Supreme Court refused to apply
the Spearin Doctrine where a contractor on a sewer line project incurred
additional expenses resulting from an encounter with concretions 64 and water
inflows.65 The contractor claimed that the Spearin Doctrine applied in order
to hold the city responsible where he relied on subsurface boring reports and
test excavations prepared by the design engineer.66  However, an express
contract provision specifically excluded these reports from being part of the
60. Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 424-25 (1995).
61. See Burgess Mining & Constr. Corp. v. Bessemer, 312 So. 2d 24, 27 (Ala. 1975)
(citing Simpsen v. United States, 172 U.S. 372 (1899), "If the contractor is bound to build
according to plans and specifications prepared by the owner, the contractor will not be
responsible for the consequences of defects in the plans and specifications."); Chaney Bldg.
Co. v. Tucson, 716 P.2d 28, 31 (Ariz. 1986) ("A contractor is also not liable for damages
which are the direct result of defective plans and specifications furnished by the owner.");
Graham Constr. Co. v. Earl, 208 S.W.3d 106, 109 (Ark. 2005) ("When an owner supplies
plans and specifications to a contractor, an implied warranty arises that the owner's plans
and specifications are adequate and suitable for the particular project."); E. H. Morrill Co. v.
State, 423 P.2d 551, 554 (Cal. 1967) (holding the government's responsibility to provide
plans and specifications free from defects is not overcome by general clauses); BRW, Inc. v.
Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66, 73 (Colo. 2004) ("The City impliedly warranted the
adequacy of the plans and specifications.").
62. See Sandy Hites Co. v. State Highway Comm., 149 S.W.2d 828, 833-34 (Mo. 1941)
(holding that there is no implied warranty by. the owner of the sufficiency of plans and
specifications.).
63. S & M Constructors v. City of Columbus, 434 N.E.2d. 1349 (Ohio 1982).
64. A concretion is a mass of hard mineral found in sedimentary rock. THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 297 (4th ed. 2002).
65. S & M Constructors, 434 N.E.2d at 1350.
66. Id. at 1352.
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contract documents.67 Thus, the court found the case distinguishable from
Spearin, and the city was not at fault.
68
Spearin has been applied four times by Ohio courts in cases subsequent to
S & M and prior to Dugan & Meyers.69 The decisions in Smoot Co. v. Ohio
and Trucco Construction Co. v. City of Columbus70 are most important to the
discussion at hand. The Smoot court cited a federal case from Georgia which
held that recovery would be denied under Spearin if: (1) actual job site
conditions would have been revealed by a reasonable inspection by the
contractor; or (2) the government provided accurate information, "but the
conclusions drawn therefrom by the contractor differed from the actual site
conditions. '' 71 Additionally, the court held that if the information provided by
the government is intended to be used by contractors to compute their bids,
implied warranties as to the accuracy of the information will prevail over any
contract clause which disclaims responsibility for accuracy of the
information. 72 In applying these rules, the court held that because pre-bid
investigation would not have revealed the conditions at issue, the contractor
could recover on his differing site condition claim.73
In 2006, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Tenth Appellate District
applied the Spearin-related rules articulated in Smoot to hold a contractor
responsible for his claim for differing site conditions.74 Specifically the court
held that in order to succeed on his claim, the contractor must show:
(1) that its contract contains an affirmative indication regarding
the subsurface or latent physical condition that forms the basis of
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Dugan & Meyers Constr. Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Admin. Servs., 864 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio
2007).
70. Smoot Co. v. Ohio, 736 N.E.2d 69 (2000); Trucco Constr. Co. v. City of Columbus,
2006-Ohio-6984; See also Lehmkuhl Excavation v. Troy, No. 2004-CA-31, 2005 WL
994607, at 1 24 (Ohio 2005) ("Spearin stands for the proposition that the city cannot make
affirmative statements regarding site conditions and then hold the contractor responsible for
any conditions differing from those asserted by the City, notwithstanding contractual
provisions purporting to do so."); Central Ohio Bd. of Educ. v. Peterson Constr. Co., 716
N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (1998) (holding a contractor cannot rely upon the Spearin doctrine where
the contractor had unique knowledge the plans were obviously flawed and did not inform the
owner).
71. Smoot, 736 N.E.2d 69 at 77 (citing Robert E. McKee, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 414 F.
Supp. 957, 959-960 (N.D. Ga. 1976)).
72. Id. at 76.
73. Id. at 77.
74. Trucco Constr. Co. v. Columbus, No. 05AP-1134, 2006 WL 3825262, 39 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2006).
[Vol. 3:183
HeinOnline -- 3 Liberty U.L Rev. 192 2009
DRA WINGS THAT WORK-OR MAYBE NOT?
the claim; (2) that the contractor interpreted the contract as would
a reasonably prudent contractor; (3) that the contractor reasonably
relied upon the contract indications regarding the subsurface or
latent physical condition; (4) that the contractor encountered
conditions at the job site which differed materially from the
contract indications regarding the subsurface or latent physical
condition; (5) that the actual conditions encountered by the
contractor were reasonably unforeseeable; and (6) that the
contractor incurred increased costs which are solely attributable to
the materially different subsurface or latent physical condition.75
The Ohio Court of Appeals only discussed the first of the listed factors
because it was dispositive of the Spearin Claim. 76 The court overruled the
contractor's Spearin-related assignment of error because the contract did not
contain an affirmative indication regarding subsurface conditions. 7
The principal that emerges from the Spearin cases in Ohio is that when
there is a conflict between drawings and specifications that are part of the
contract and actual job site conditions, the contractor is not responsible for
additional expenses, notwithstanding an express contract provision limiting
the government's liability.78 In addition, to avoid liability for his increased
expenses, a contractor must show that he was acting in good faith-i.e., he
had visited the job site prior to bidding the project, the differing site
conditions must not have been readily apparent from a reasonable inspection,
and he must not have known that the plans were defective and not have
informed the owner.79
B. Taking a Wrong Turn in Columbus
Dugan & Meyers Constr. Co. v. Ohio Dep "t of Admin. Servs. involved a
twenty million dollar contract to build three buildings for Ohio State
University's business school.80  Dugan & Meyers agreed to complete
construction on the buildings in accordance with drawings and specifications
provided by the project architect hired by the state .8  Three other key
75. Id. at 36 (quoting Smoot, 736 N.E.2d 69 at 174).
76. Id. at 39.
77. Id.
78. Dugan & Meyers Constr. Co. v: Ohio Dep't of Admin. Servs., 864 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio
2007).
79. Smoot, 736 N.E.2d 69 at 77; see also Trucco, 2006 WL 3825262, at 39.
80. Dugan & Meyers Constr. Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Admin. Servs., 864 N.E.2d 68, 70
(Ohio 2007).
81. Id.
2009] 193 .
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contract provisions involved the project timeline. The first provision stated
that the entire project would be completed in six hundred and sixty days -
enforceable by a $,3000 per day liquidated damages provision. 2 The second
held that the contractor would not be entitled to any additional compensation
or mitigation of liquidated damages for delays regardless of whether the state
was at fault.83 The final contract provision at issue stated that failure to ask
for an extension of time constituted a waiver on the contractor's part for any
claim for mitigation of liquidated damages or a claim of extension of time.
84
Approximately one year after construction began, when the interior work
was progressing, Dugan & Meyers discovered "numerous omissions,
inaccuracies, and conflicts in the design documents. 'a  To clarify these
omissions, inaccuracies, and conflicts, Dugan & Meyers sent over seven
hundred requests for information to the architect, the majority of which the
architect did not respond to in a timely manner.8 6 In an effort to correct and
clarify defects in the original plans, the state's architect issued over two
hundred fifty field work-orders and eighty-five architectural supplemental
instructions to Dugan & Meyers. 7 All of these defects and resulting
corrections by the architect materially impacted the project schedule. 8 After
Dugan & Meyers failed in its attempt to bring the project back on schedule,
the state fired them and hired another contractor to complete the project.8 9
Dugan & Meyers filed suit in the Ohio Court of Claims after the state
rejected a request for recovery of the contract balance, delay damages, and
reversal of the liquidated damages and then subsequently back-charged
Dugan & Meyers $589,340.00.90 In the suit, Dugan & Meyers alleged that
82. Id.
83. Id. at 70.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 71.
86. Id. at 72.
87. Id. "A field order is a written order issued by the owner or the owner's
representative to the contractor as a directive to clarify a specification, resolve a site access
difficulty, deal with technical execution problems, or change the contract documents." THE
CONSTRUCTION PROJECT: PHASES, PEOPLE, TERMS, PAPERWORK, PROCESSES 141 (Marilyn
Klinger & Marianne Susong eds., 2006). An architect's supplemental instruction is a written
form issued by the architect to issue additional instructions or interpretations or to order
minor changes in the work which do not involve a change to the contract price or schedule.
See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, FORM G710 - ARCHITECT'S SUPPLEMENTAL
INSTRUCTIONS (1992). See also, The American Institute of Architects, Documents Synopses
by Series, FORM G710-1992 2008, Nov. 26, 2008, http://www.aia.org/docs-seriesg.
88. Dugan, 864 N.E.2d at 71.
89. Id.
90. Dugan & Meyers Constr. Co. v. Ohio Dep't. of Admin. Servs., 834 N.E.2d 1, 6, 7,
14 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (observing that the amount back-charged to Dugan & Meyers
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the state had breached its implied warranty under the Spearin Doctrine and
that this breach resulted in delays to the project that were beyond their
control.9' The Court of Claims found for Dugan & Meyers and awarded
them over $3.5 million dollars.92 The Court of Claims held that the primary
reason for the construction delay was the defective drawings supplied by the
state's architect and that the state breached its contract with Dugan & Meyers
by dismissing them. 93 The court reasoned that the state offered no evidence
in rebuttal to the fact that the drawings were in fact inaccurate and
incomplete.94 The state appealed and the judgment was overturned.95 Dugan
& Meyers then appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
96
The Ohio Supreme Court, in upholding the Court of Appeals decision, first
refused to extend the Spearin Doctrine beyond the context of site conditions
to encompass delays due to changes in defective plans.97 The court relied
heavily on the no-damages-for-delay provision in the construction contract in
its analysis and cited the S & M case to support its contention that the state
was not liable for damages. 98 However, as discussed above,99 the court failed
to mention the fact that in S & M, the defective plans were expressly
excluded from the contract by a contract provision in contrast to Dugan &
Meyer's contract. 00 An additional problem with the court's reasoning is
because, in order to reach its decision, it cited the rationale that Dugan &
Meyers had not followed the express contractual procedure to formally
request an extension in writing.10' As the Court of Claims determined,
Dugan & Meyers did not ask for an extension because they knew none would
be granted; the state had repeatedly contended that no time extension would
consisted of $264,340.00-the additional expense of hiring another contractor after Dugan
& Meyers was dismissed-and liquidated damages totaling $325,000.)
91. Dugan & Meyers Constr. Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Admin. Servs., 864 N.E.2d 68, 70,
71-72 (Ohio 2007).
92. Dugan & Meyers, 834 N.E.2d at 3.
93. Dugan & Meyers, 864 N.E.2d at 71-72.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 72.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 68, 73.
98. Id. at 73.
99. See supra note 65.
100. S & M Constructors, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 434 N.E.2d. 1349, 1352 (Ohio
1982).
101. Dugan & Meyers, 864 N.E.2d at 76.
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be allowed. 0 2 Additionally the trial court record was full of evidence that the
project was going to be delayed and that Dugan & Meyers would be pursuing
claims.
0 3
The Court then contended that two things must be present in order to find
for Dugan & Meyers: (1) the state impliedly warranted that its plans were
free from defects; and (2) that this implied warranty would prevail over
express contractual provisions.' °4 In finding that neither one of these two
conditions was present, the court maintained that to find otherwise "would
contravene established precedent, which we will not do."'0 5 However, Ohio
precedent clearly shows that the government does impliedly warrant
construction drawings, which are incorporated into the contract, to be free
from defects if those drawings are being utilized in the preparation of bids
and that this warranty is not preempted by contract provisions absolving
owners of all liability resulting from defective plans.0 6 To further bolster
support for their argument, the majority approvingly quoted the findings of
the Court of Appeals stating that proof of the plans were adequately shown
by the completion of the project by another contractor.' ° What the majority
failed to acknowledge was the degree of correction necessary to make the
drawings buildable and the fact that the project was completed six months
behind schedule. 0 8 Thus, Dugan & Meyers had to pay the State of Ohio
$325,000.00 in liquidated damages and they were not entitled to any breach
of contract damages.'0 9
In his dissent, Justice Pfeifer stated that the fault rested with the owner's
plans, as in all Spearin Doctrine Cases, and contended that the owner's plans
and specifications had to be free from defects in order for the construction
(and contractual) process to work properly." 0 To illustrate the level of
discord with the majority, Justice Pfeifer declared:
The majority seems to suggest that an owner need not be
concerned with preparing accurate plans, since any deficiencies
102. Thompson Hine LLP, Construction Update: A New Paradigm for Ohio's
Construction Industry?, Jun. 5, 2007, http://www.thompsononhine.com/publications/
publication I 089.html.
103. Id.
104. Dugan & Meyers, 864 N.E.2d 68 at 75.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Smoot Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Admin. Serv., 736 N.E.2d 69, 76 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2000).
107. Dugan & Meyers, 864 N.E.2d at 76.
108. Id. at 71.
109. Dugan & Meyers, 834 N.E.2d at 6.
110. Id. at 76-77.
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must be corrected by the contractor. As it turns out, the state
could have saved a lot of money on blueprints and just submitted
some sketches on the backs of a few cocktail napkins."'
The dissent went on to argue that the majority relied upon two cases
incorrectly. As discussed above, 1 2 the S & M case stood for the proposition
that a contractor could not claim that delays and damages were a result of the
city's plans when the documents at issue were not part of the contract
documents.' 13 In the second case relied upon by the majority, Carribine
Construction, the contractor caused the delay when he failed to have the
construction site rezoned as per his contractual obligation. 1 4 In contrast, the
majority merely characterized Carribine as standing for the proposition that
no-damages-delays clauses were enforceable and did not delve into the
details of the case, which would have distinguished it from Dugan & Meyers'
situation." 5
According to Justice Pfeifer, the case boiled down to one question: Were
the delays caused by the design mistakes on the owner's drawings?" 6 The
answer to this essential Spearin Doctrine question was a clear yes - the
answer correctly provided by the trial court." 7
C. The Aftermath-Interesting Times for Ohio Construction
In 1998, after Dugan & Meyers had entered into their contract with the
state, the Ohio Legislature passed the Fairness in Contracting Act, which,
among other things, made no-damages-for-delay clauses void and unenforce-
able as a matter of public policy."' Unfortunately, as the Supreme Court of
111. Id. at 77.
112. See S & M Constructors, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
113. Dugan & Meyers, 864 N.E.2d at 78.
114. Id. at 78-79 (citing Carrabine Constr. Co. v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 495 N.E.2d 952
(Ohio 1986)).
115. Id. at 74-75 (citing Carrabine, 495 N.E.2d 952).
116. Id. at 79.
117. Id.
118. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.62(C)(1) (2007), which states in part:
Any provision of a construction contract, agreement, or understanding, or
specification or other documentation that is made a part of a construction
contract, agreement, or understanding, that waives or precludes liability for
delay during the course of a construction contract when the cause of the delay
is a proximate result of the owner's act or failure to act, or that waives any
other remedy for a construction contract when the cause of the delay is a
proximate result of the owner's act or failure to act, is void and unenforceable
as against public policy.
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Ohio pointed out, no-damages-for-delays clauses were valid under Ohio law
when the parties entered into their contract." 9
Time will show that the court's decision will raise more questions than it
attempted to settle. 120 According to the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in
this case, Spearin does not stand for the proposition that a contractor will be
entitled to damages and extensions of time because plans and specifications
furnished by an owner require "agreed changes in the work necessitated by
some force not within the complete control of the contractor.' 2' By this
reasoning, the Spearin Doctrine has been relegated to apply only where the
plans furnished by the owner are completely impossible to build from.'
22
Now in Ohio, and in jurisdictions that look to this decision, contractors may
only use the Spearin Doctrine as a defensive weapon against a building
owner's claims of non-conforming and defective construction. 23 When a
contractor is faced with plans and specifications that contain conflicts and
defects, he may not have a choice but to go ahead and build according to the
defective information. 24 Otherwise, he must be prepared to hold up the
project to wait on an owner's decision on the defect in the drawings. 121
Either choice will do nothing, but result in a longer project, a more
adversarial atmosphere, and increased taxpayer expense.1
26
Most importantly, the Dugan & Meyers decision almost completely
removes the responsibility from architects to produce construction documents
free from defects. A contractor is not professionally licensed, and he does
not carry the proper liability insurance to design around flawed drawings or
fill in holes left by architects. Yet, the American Institute of Architects
119. Dugan & Meyers, 864 N.E.2d at 74.
120. Thompson Hine LLP, Construction Update: A New Paradigm for Ohio's
Construction Industry?, Jun. 5, 2007, http://www.thompsonhine.com/publications/
publication 1 089.html.
121. Dugan & Meyers Construction Co. v. Ohio Dept. of Admin. Servs., 834 N.E.2d 1, 9
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
122. Thomas L. Rosenberg, Is the Spearin Doctrine Dead in Ohio or Just Wounded?
(2006), http://library.findlaw.com/2006/Jul/ 1/246726.html.
123. Patrick A. Devine, Conflict Between Implied Contractual Obligations and the
Written Word: Is the Spearin Doctrine All That It Was Cracked up to Be?, UNDER CON-
STRUCTION (Newsletter of the ABA Forum on the Construction Industry, Chicago, IL.),
August 2007, 5, 7; see also Brickler & Eckler LLP, The Spearin Doctrine and Owner
Disclaimers, June 2005, http://bricker.com/legalservices.industry/construction/resources/
articles/155.asp. (defining defensive use of Spearin Doctrine).
124. Id.
125. Thompson Hine LLP, Construction Update: A New Paradigm for Ohio's
Construction Industry?, Jun. 5, 2007, http://www.thompsononhine.com/publications/
publication 1 089.html.
126. Id.
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("AIA"), the nation's leading architectural professional organization,
discourages express warranties in contracts with building owners. 27  The
reasoning behind this policy is that like most professionals, architects should
not be required to guarantee results. However, unlike the practice of law or
medicine, whose uncertainties stem from the human element, architecture
involves designing a physical structure that manipulates tangible objects in
order to produce a building. The absurdity of this refusal to guarantee results
is analogous to a BMW engineer giving his manufacturing team a stack of
drawings and saying, "I'm pretty sure you can build a new 325i if you go by
these, but I won't guarantee it. You figure it out and take responsibility for
producing the finished product."
In addition to worrying about construction means and methods, contractors
are now obligated to second guess the adequacy of plans and specifications.
During the bidding process, prudent contractors will include additional
money in their bid as an allowance just in case a flaw in the plans and
specifications presents itself later, resulting in increased cost. Incompetent or
unscrupulous contractors, in order to obtain the lowest bid, will not include
such allowances and will instead try to tie up the project, pressuring the
owner for more money with the threat of lengthy and costly litigation. Either
way, the taxpayer is the one who suffers on a publicly-funded project. In
addition to the waste of taxpayer dollars, neither one of the situations
described above is an efficient use of scarce economic resources.
2 1
IV. WHAT CAN BE DONE?
If a building owner wanted to completely shift the risk of defective design
to the contractor, he could do so by writing a performance specification.'2 9 In
contrast to design specifications, which set forth plans that the contractor
must follow, a performance specification sets forth an objective and leaves
the contractor to his own devices to determine how to achieve that
objective.'3" So-called "design-build" contracts place the architect and
contractor into one entity for the purposes of the project.' The architect and
contractor work in concert to produce a buildable design that meets the
127. See Watch Your Language: Express Warranties, AIA BEST PRACTICES, January
2007, http://www.aia.org.
128. Economic efficiency is defined as a situation where a unit of good is produced at the
least possible cost. Mike McFall, What Does Economic Efficiency Mean?,
http://economics.about.com/od/productivity/f/economiceff.htm.
129. Brickler & Eckler LLP, The Spearin Doctrine and Owner Disclaimers, June 2005,
http://bricker.com/legalservicesindustry/construction/resources/articles/155,asp.
130. Id.
131. CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra note 8, at 84.
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owner's objectives. The central premise of a design-build project is that when
the architect. and contractor are on the same team, "they are better able to
address constructability issues during design, thereby lowering the overall
cost of the project and shortening the duration between project design and
final completion.'
32
Design-build projects, with their one-team approach involving architects
and contractors, lend themselves well to privately financed projects and are in
fact becoming quite popular. 33 The problem that makes them impracticable
for publicly financed projects is that a contractor cannot produce a hard bid
with a performance objective. In order to accurately produce a bid, a
contractor needs completely designed drawings and a well-defined scope of
work. And many states have laws that require publicly financed construction
projects to be competitively bid rather than negotiated.134
Like Ohio's Fairness in Contracting statute passed by the Ohio legislature,
statutes allowing public sector design-build projects greatly streamline
construction and reduce job site finger pointing. 13  Procedural safeguards
could be put in place that would still ensure the most prudent expenditure of
tax dollars, such as having the contractors compete on a profit percentage and
design fee basis rather than total project costs. Trade organizations such as
the Associated General Contractors of America have lobbying arms in all
fifty states and at the federal level, which are in an excellent position to get
laws passed that will uniformly ban no-damages-for-delay clauses and allow
public design-build construction projects.' 36
In lieu of seeking a legislative solution, the solution is dependent upon
whether the contractor is sophisticated or a small player. As Professor Carl J.
Circo points out:
Major, sophisticated parties can negotiate contracts that serve their
objectives and that facilitate commercially reasonable allocation of
risk and responsibility. The same is not true for those who are less
132. Id. at 84-85.
133. Id. at 85. (citing Mark C. Friedlander, A Primer on Industrial Design/Build
Construction Contracts, CONSTR. LAWYER 3 (April 1994); Neil S. Haldrop & Mason A.,
Design-Build in the Public Sector, CONSTR. LAWYER 38 (Oct. 1998).
134. Phil Bruner & Patrick J. O'Connor Jr., BRUNER & O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION
LAW 92 (2002).
135. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN § 4113.62(C)(1) (2007).
136. Currently, only a handful of states statutorily ban no damages for delay clauses. See
CAL. PuB. CONT. CODE § 7102 (2004); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.360-4.24.370 (1988).
CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 7102 (1985 & Supp. 1990); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-91-103.5, 24-
91-102, 24-91-110 (1988 & Supp.1990); Mo. REv. STAT. § 34.058 (Supp.1991); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.380 (1988).
200 [Vol. 3:183
HeinOnline -- 3 Liberty U.L Rev. 200 2009
DRA WINGS THAT WORK-OR MA YBE NOT?
sophisticated or for those who have relatively little bargaining
leverage. In practice, these participants often rely heavily on
industry form contracts and on the good faith of their contractual
counterparties. Given the highly competitive nature of the
construction industry and the conflicting risk management interests
of the parties, it is not surprising that contracting practices tend to
preserve and strengthen the commercially fittest.137
For sophisticated parties who usually employ the assistance of counsel in
drafting and negotiating contracts, the solution begins with attorneys taking a
more central role in the construction industry. Attorneys, when brought into
a construction project, are almost always there after a dispute arises, rather
than playing a proactive role in contract planning or risk assessment. 138 A
problem then arises in that many attorneys are not experienced enough in
construction law to do an adequate job of reviewing construction contract
documents. 39  The responsibility then falls to legal education, which is
almost devoid of construction law subjects.1 40 Increased emphasis in law
schools on construction law principles produces attorneys who are more
capable and willing to educate clients to seek legal advice at the transactional
phase-which serves to alleviate disputes and litigation during the course of
construction.
As Professor Circo points out above, most small contractors often rely on
industry form contracts. 141 Most often, the form contract relied on is a
standardized contract produced by the American Institute of Architects
(AIA). These contracts generally contain, among the standard terms and
conditions, a clause relating to Spearin-type conflicts. 42 This clause will
entitle a contractor to receive additional time and expense when site
conditions differ from what is described in the contract documents.
1 43
However, AIA contracts do not contain provisions that will entitle a
137. Carl J. Circo, When Specialty Designs Cause Building Disasters: Responsibility for
Shared Architectural and Engineering Services, 84 NEB. L. REv. 162,232(2005).
138. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform in a
Transactional System, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 463,492 (1998).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 495-96. As of 1998, only twenty member institutions of the American
Association of Law Schools provided current offerings focusing on construction law. Id.
However, upon review of a typical contracts textbook, it was found that nearly one in five
cases involved construction contracts. Id. at 494.
141. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
142. Brickler & Eckler LLP, The Spearin Doctrine and Owner Disclaimers, June 2005,
http:/fbricker.com/legalservices.industry/construction/resources/articles/I 55.asp.
143. Id.
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contractor to damages when he discovers errors which do not relate to site
conditions.' 44 Inclusion by the AIA of such a clause will serve to take the
burden off contractors of second-guessing the architect's design.
V. CONCLUSION
Architects, like all professionals, must display a level of competency
commensurate with other professionals in their respective industry.
However, unlike other professionals, architects should guarantee results
because they are dealing with physical, finite, and known objects. The
Spearin Doctrine was developed to prevent contractors from being
responsible for defective drawings in spite of any contractual provision that
holds otherwise. 14  The decision of the Ohio Supreme Court overturns
almost a century of legal protection for contractors and will serve to make
publicly-funded construction projects more adversarial and ultimately more
costly to the taxpayer.
Unfortunately, there is no simple solution to this complex problem. The
Ohio legislature took a step in the right direction when it passed a statute
holding no-damages-for-delays clauses unenforceable as a matter of law.
Contractors' trade associations need to take steps to ensure that comparable
legislation, as well as legislation allowing design-build construction for
publicly-funded projects, is passed in all fifty states. In addition, law schools
should improve treatment of construction law curriculum in concert with the
AIA inserting protective provisions into its standard form contracts; these
changes will serve to alleviate future Dugan & Meyers type conflicts.
144. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, FORM A201--GENERAL CONDITIONS OF
THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION (1997).
145. Patrick A. Devine, Conflict Between Implied Contractual Obligations and the
Written Word: Is the Spearin Doctrine All That It Was Cracked up to Be?, UNDER
CONSTRUCTION (Newsletter of the ABA Forum on the Construction Industry, Chicago, IL.),
August 2007, at 5.
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